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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
--0000000--
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff /Respondent, 
vs. 
DAVID ALLEN PATTERSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 
--0000000--
APPELLANT' S BRIEF 
--0000000--
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The appellant, David Allen Patterson, appeals his conviction 
of uttering a forged check under the provisions of Section 76-6-
501 (b), UCA, 1977. The case was tried before a jury in the Fourth 
.Judicial District Court for Utah County, State of Utah, before the 
Honorable Allen B. Sorensen. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Upon the conclusion of the evidence, the jury returned a 
verdict of guilty. The court sustained the verdict and the defen-
dant was convicted for uttering a forged check, a second degree 
felony. The defendant was later sentenced to one to 15 years in 
the Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of his conviction for uttering a 
forged check, or that failing, a new trial. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 20, 1980, the defendant, David Allen Patterson, 
and James Anthony Mathoes, originally a co-defendant in this cas 
rented an automobile from Morris Motors in Provo, Utah. Mathoes 
had originally attempted to rent the automobile using his licens 
but the office worker refused to rent the automobile to him 
because there was some question about his Virginia license. 
Patterson then proceeded to rent the automobile using the licens 
of Micah Roy Woodward. Woodward had previously lived across the 
street from Mathoes. One of the office workers at Morris Motors 
testified the automobile was checked out at approximately 10:20 
a.m. and another office worker testified the automobile was 
checked in at approximately 1:30 p.m. Patterson and Mathoes bot 
testified that the automobile was checked in and checked out at 
different times from those indicated by the employees of Morris 
Motors. There was conflicting testimony about whether Mathoes 
returned the automobile by himself or accompanied by Patterson. 
Anne Morris Boatman, an employee, Blair T. Reese, a salesman, an 
Mathoes testified that Patterson was with Mathoes when the auto1 
bile was returned to the car lot. Patterson testified that 
Mathoes returned the automobile unaccompanied by Patterson. 
Patterson's version of not being with Mathoes when the automobil 
was returned was substantiated by his brother Carl Patterson. 
Patterson testified that after renting the automobile hew< 
to his parents' home to work on his truck. He was at his parent 
home until approximately 11:00 to 11:30 when he left with his 
brother to pick up a paycheck, which Patterson was owed by a 
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person in Spanish Fork. The proceeds from the check were needed 
to pay for a part needed to repair his truck. 
Patterson and his brother stopped at a fast food restaurant 
in Spanish Fork and could not restart the car. Patterson and his 
brother were attempting to locate the problem with the automobile 
when Mathoes drove up in the rental car. Mathoes gave Patterson a 
ride to a place Patterson thought he could pick up his paycheck. 
He wasn't able to pick up his paycheck and Mathoes returned him to 
the fast food restaurant. During the time they were gone, 
Patterson's brother diagnosed the problem as being a broken 
battery terminal. Mathoes then offered to give Patterson and his 
brother a ride to the home of Patterson's fiance in Pleasant 
Grove. 
On the way to Pleasant Grove, Mathoes asked Patterson to cash 
a check for him. He said the check belonged to his friend who was 
laid up in bed. Patterson went into the bank to cash the check 
and was told by the bank teller that he would have to speak to the 
manager because the signature on the check was irregular and there 
was an insufficient amount of money in the account to pay the 
check. Patterson gave the bank manager the telephone number and 
address of Mathoes. When asked, Patterson gave the bank manager 
his name and never represented that he was Roy Woodward, the payee 
on the check. Patterson left the bank and told Mathoes what had 
transpired. 
Mathoes gave Patterson and his brother a ride to the resi-
dence of Judy Stubbs, Patterson's fiance, where Patterson and his 
brother remained until Stubbs returned home from work at approxi-
mately 3:30. 
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-Carl Patterson testified that he was with his brother from 
8: 30 a.m. until they returned to the Stubbs' residence at appro 
imately 3:30. Carl's testimony substantiated his brother's 
testimony about meeting Mathoes at the fast food restaurant in 
Spanish Fork and the conversations concerning the check. 
Kay Lue Patterson, David Patterson's mother, testified tha 
David arrived at her house at approximately 8:30 a.m. and left 
with his brother Carl at 11:00 a.m. 
Judy Stubbs testified that when she returned home at 3:30, 
David Patterson and his mother and Carl were there. 
Mathoes, an accomplice turned state witness, testified t~ 
after renting the 9:00 to 9:30 he drove with Patterson to the 
Springville/Spanish Fork area, then stopped at the residence of 
Leon Swenson and when Swenson unexpectedly returned home, 
Patterson spoke with him. 
Patterson and Mathoes left the Swenson residence and drove 
the Stanley Burningham residence. Patterson went into the 
Burningham residence and returned with a packet of checks and s1 
savings bonds. 
Patterson and Mathoes drove to First Security Bank in 
Springville. While sitting in the automobile, Mathoes filled 01 
one of the blank checks and made it payable to Roy Woodward int 
amount of $2,666.00. He also forged the signature of Stanley 
Burningham. Patterson endorsed Ray Woodward's name and went in! 
the bank to cash the check. Patterson reutnred to the automobii 
explained what happened inside the bank and they went to "a Utt 
hamburger stand someplace in the area and threw the checkbook 
away." 
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The next day when confronted with the crime, Mathoes dis-
closed the location of the checkbook which was retrieved from a 
trash dumpster by Detective Fox of the Utah County Sheriff's 
Office. 
Leon Swenson testified at approximately 10:45 or 11:00 a.m. 
on November 20, 1980, he returned horn to find the rental car from 
Morris Motors parked in his driveway. He had a conversation with 
Patterson who told him he thought it was someone else's residence. 
Roger Williams, the bank manager of First Security Bank in 
Springville, testified that Patterson represented that he was Roy 
Woodward. Leslee Hanson, a teller at First Security Bank in 
Springville, also testified that Patterson represented himself to 
be Roy Woodward. 
Stanley Burningham testified that checks and some savings 
bonds had been taken from his residence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT UNDULY RESTRICTED THE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITU-
TIONAL RIGHT OF CROSS-EXAMINATION. 
During the cross-examination of James Mathoes, originally a 
co-defendant in this case, the following colloquy was engaged in 
by Mathoes and Shelden R Carter, the appellant's counsel: 
MR. CARTER: Have you ever been convicted of a felony, Mr. 
Mathoes? 
MR. MATHOES: Yes, sir. 
MR. CARTER: Where at? 
MR. MATHOES: Virginia. 
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MR. WATSON: I will object. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. CARTER: What was the nature of the accusation you wer1 
convicted of? 
MR. WATSON: I object. 
THE COURT: 
remain. 
Sustained. His answer to the first question• 
MR. CARTER: How many felonies have you been convicted of? 
MR. WATSON: I object. (Record at 77). 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. CARTER: Tell me about your deal you made with Mr. 
Watson. 
MR. MATHOES: He just -- when I first got pulled over at 
American Fork I went down. They asked me, you know, about 
everything that went on and I wouldn't say nothing. And tt 
I come out and told them everything I knew. 
MR. CARTER: How many burglaries is he going to dismiss for 
your testimony? 
MR. WATSON: Your Honor, I object. 
THE COURT: Sustained. I will have to give you a caution, 
Mr. Carter. 
MR. CARTER: 
this point. 
Your Honor, I would like to make a proffer at 
(Record at 78). 
The right of confrontation of witnesses is guaranteed by 
Article l, Section 12, Constitution of Utah, and the Sixth Amend 
ment to the Constitution of the United States. 
The Utah Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court 
have stated that wide latitude should be allowed in the area of 
bias and motive for testifying. State v. Maestas, 564 P.2d 138i 
(Utah 1977); State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744 (Utah 1975); Davis v. 
Alaska, 415 U.S. 1005 (1974). 
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It was error for the trial court to refuse to allow the 
appellant's attorney to question Mathoes on the "nature of the 
accusations he was convicted of" and the "number of felonies he 
had been convicted of." A case on point is State v. Kazda, 14 
Utah 2d 266, 382 P.2d 407 (1963). In that case an accused took 
the stand voluntarily as his own witness. The court stated on 
cross-examination he may be asked whether or not he has ever been 
convicted of a felony. If he answers in the affirmative he may be 
asked the nature of the felony. Furthermore, he may be asked if 
he has been convicted of more than one felony, and if so, the type 
or nature thereof. These are the exact questions asked defense 
counsel in the above quoted trial transcript and the trial court 
refused to permit an answer to those questions. 
The trial court further didn't allow an inquiry into the 
number of burglary charges the state was going to dismiss as a 
result of the plea bargaining agreement that Mathoes had entered 
into with the State of Utah. As this court stated in State v. 
Chesnut, 621 P.2d 1228, 1233 (Utah 1980): 
A trial court should be particularly solicitous of cross-
examination intended to disclose bias or prejudice; e.g., a 
broad opportunity for examination should be allowed if its 
objective is to establish that an adverse witness in a 
criminal matter is giving his testimony in anticipation of 
favorable personal treatment, such as, police leniency by the 
state ••• 
Certainly, Mathoes bias or prejudice for testifying would be 
different in this case where the state had dismissed ten burglary 
charges against him in addition to allowing him to plead to a 
lesser included offense than in a case where the state simply 
allowed the co-defendant to plead guilty to a lesser included 
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offense in exchange for his testimony. The fact ten burglary 
charges were dismissed against Mathoes should have been disclo 
to the jury. Mathoes was a key witness and prosecution's case 
largely dependent upon the credibility of his testimony. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's restriction upon defense counsel's crosa 
examination and exploration of bias, prejudice, and examination 
previous felony convictions of the state's key witness denied 
defendant's right to confrontation and presentation of evidence 
indicating bias; thereby requiring reversal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~day of March, 1982. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a copy of the foregoing to 
Utah State Attorney General, State Capitol Building, Room 236, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, postage prepaid, this day of 
March, 1982. 
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